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Abstract
This paper carries out an empirical investigation of the impact on bond spreads of the
announcement, purchases and exit from the SNB’s bond purchase program in 2009-2010.
We find evidence in favor of a narrowing yield spread of covered bonds as a result of the
program. The effect materialized in the days following the announcement of the SNB’s
intention to buy bonds issued by private sector borrowers, as markets learned that the
SNB was buying covered bonds. The specification of the bond spreads used allows us to
identify this effect as a discounted portfolio balance effect of the expected purchases, as
distinct from policy signalling. In contrast, we find no evidence of a further effect of the
actual purchases and subsequent sales on bond spreads.
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21 Introduction
As policy rates were reduced to the lower bound in early 2009 in many western countries, and
the economic outlook called for further monetary stimulus, a number of central banks resorted
to using alternative monetary policy tools. Among these were outright asset purchases. The
Federal Reserve engaged in large scale asset purchases, in several rounds, starting in late
2008. The Bank of England carried out purchases of Gilts, also in several rounds. The Bank
of Japan was engaged in government bond purchases even before the Financial Crisis, and
has continued to purchase bonds throughout the crisis period. The ECB has also purchased
sovereign bonds, although on a smaller scale and with a different objective. What is less well
known is that the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has also engaged in asset purchases as an un-
conventional policy measure. In March 2009, the SNB announced its intention to buy bonds
by private issuers, after which it bought covered and non-bank corporate bonds directly from
the markets. The SNB’s bond purchase program is unique in international comparison in that
the program has already been exited. Without announcement, the bonds were discretely sold
off in 2010. This paper looks at the effect of the announcement of the program, and exploits
the variation in the Swiss data on bond purchases and sales to carry out an empirical inves-
tigation and identification of the effects of these on Swiss covered and corporate credit spreads.
Central bank asset purchases are argued to affect long-term interest rates mainly through
two channels. The first is the policy signalling channel, which suggests that a central bank’s
engagement in asset purchases independently signals something to market participants about
the central bank’s intended future policy stance, which in turn affects expected future policy
rates. The second is the portfolio balance effect, which suggests that under certain assump-
tions about market segmentation, the effect of an asset purchase induced change in the relative
supply of the purchased asset can affect its price. A large and very active empirical literature
investigates the importance of the difference channels of transmission of currently active asset
purchase programs. Recent examples for the US and UK programs include Gagnon et al.
(2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), Neely (2010) and Joyce et al. (2011). Preliminary investi-
gations of the ECB’s securities markets program are discussed in Manganelli (2012). While
this literature has made substantial advances in estimating the likely effect of central bank
purchases on the yields of the purchased assets, it has proved harder to empirically identify
the different channels through which this effect has come about (Bauer and Rudebusch (2011),
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012)). The predominant approach to identifying the different
channels has been to estimate term structure models, noting that portfolio balance effects
should affect only term premia, whereas policy signalling effects should affect only the risk
neutral part of interest rates (i.e. expected future short rates). However, the outcome of term
structure model estimation is uncertain and highly dependent on the specific model estimated.
We contribute to this literature by studying the effects of the SNB bond purchase program
on bond spreads. In March 2009, the SNB announced that it would be purchasing bonds is-
sued by private borrowers. The announcement was part of a broader package of measures
to address the adverse economic circumstances at the time, including more provision of liq-
uidity and foreign exchange interventions. The bond purchases took place during the spring
and summer of 2009. The purchased bonds were subsequently discretely sold back into the
markets during 2010. This is, to the knowledge of the authors, the only central bank bond
purchase program initiated as an unconventional policy measure during the financial crisis
3which has been exited.
As only one announcement of the program was made, and many other policy initiatives
were announced by the SNB at the same occasion, we are not able to identify potential pol-
icy signalling effects of the announcement of this program. Instead, we are able to identify
portfolio balance effects. Data for the Swiss bond market allows us to compute a model-
independent measure of the variation in the issuer-specific term premium for the categories of
bonds purchased by the SNB. Portfolio balance effects affect the issuer specific term premium,
while policy signalling effects do not. We identify the portfolio balance effects by matching
the variation in the issuer specific term premium with the announcement and time profile for
the SNB bond purchases.
We find evidence of a significant fall in the term premium on covered bonds following
the announcement and implementation of the SNB bond purchase program, suggesting the
presence of expected or actual portfolio balance effects. The effect materialized in the days
following the announcement of the program, as the markets were learning that the SNB was
buying covered bonds. The purchases of covered bonds during the rest of 2009 did not exhibit
additional systematic significant effects on the covered bond spread in the daily frequency.
We also find no effects on bond spreads of the unannounced exit from the program in 2010 at
the daily frequency. One interpretation is that markets fully discounted the expected effect of
the purchases and subsequent sales in the days following the onset of the program. This would
have required that markets correctly forecasted the SNB’s intended purchases and sales, both
in terms of volumes and dates, which is unlikely. It is also possible that portfolio balance
effects of the actual purchases did occur, but not systematically, and at a different frequency
than the daily one. In this case, our data and econometric methods would not allow us to
pick it up. Another interpretation is the possible presence of reverse causality from bond
spreads to SNB bond purchase decisions. In lack of good instruments, it is very difficult to
deal econometrically with this problem. Finally, it is possible that only perceived or expected
(as opposed to actual) portfolio balance effects exist, and that these only materialize if and
when the market is aware of the central bank’s actions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how central bank purchases of Swiss
corporate bonds should be expected to affect credit spreads, and how we identify these effects
empirically. Section 3 describes an index of the credit spread for sub-categories of bonds in the
Swiss bond market. This index allows us to isolate the exact component of the term premium
which should be expected to be affected by central bank purchases. Section 4 presents the
data and conducts an event analysis based on graphical evidence, while Section 5 outlines the
econometric approach and provides regression results. The final section concludes. Appendix
provides details on the data, and a copy of the press release which announced the SNB bond
purchase program.
2 The SNB bond purchase program and identification of its
impact
At 14:00 o’clock on 12 March 2009, in connection with its regular quarterly monetary pol-
icy assessment, the SNB announced that it would engage in purchases of bonds issued by
4private sector borrowers, in order to bring about a relaxation of conditions in the capital
markets, thereby improving monetary transmission. In later speeches of SNB board mem-
bers, the policy was also referred to as credit easing, with the aim of reducing risk premia in
capital markets. The text of the press release shows that a number of other unconventional
policy measures were announced at the same occasion. The target for the 3M CHF Libor
was reduced to 0.25 percent, which was considered the effective zero lower bound, and the
targeted Libor fluctuation band was narrowed. More repo operations with longer maturities
were announced. Moreover, the SNB announced that it would engage in foreign exchange
interventions to prevent further exchange rate appreciation.
No information was given about the size of the bond purchase program, nor was any infor-
mation given on which types of privately issued bonds would be purchased. The markets thus
had to learn from the subsequent actions taken by the SNB. The SNB started to purchase
covered bonds immediately, i.e. right after 14:00 o’clock on 12 March 2009. During the first
weeks after the announcement, the SNB exclusively bought mortgage backed covered bonds.
Covered bonds, or ”pfandbriefe”, are bonds issued under a specific law for this purpose, by
one of two institutions, the Pfandbriefbank and the Pfandbriefzentrale. The purpose is to
provide funding for banks’ issuance of mortgages. The institutions are owned by the issuing
banks. Backed by mortgages pledged by banks, the two institutions issue mortgage covered
bonds which are sold in the markets. The proceeds of these bond sales are then lent on to
the banks which have pledged the mortgages. At issuance, covered bonds have at least three
years to maturity, but there are no upper constraint on the length of the maturity. In 2009,
the average maturity of outstanding covered bonds fluctuated between 4.5 and 5 years, and
its outstanding volume amounted to about CHF 64 bln.
About three weeks into the SNB bond purchase program, on 6 April 2009, the SNB com-
menced purchases of non-bank corporate bonds in addition to continuing the purchases of
covered bonds. Non-bank corporate bond purchases remained a small part of overall pur-
chases throughout the program. The vertical line in Figure 1 shows the announcement and
date of first purchases on 12 March 2009, and the red and black lines show purchases of
covered and corporate bonds respectively.
The SNB’s purchases of covered and corporate bonds took place at different times of day
during the purchase period, and the purchases continued until early July. No further bonds
were purchased after July. The purchases were officially discontinued in September 2009, and
the program was announced as completed in December 2009.
The program was exited as the bonds were sold back into the market between March
and August 2010. This was a period of falling risk aversion and high demand for assets de-
nominated in Swiss francs, notably Swiss bonds. The profile for the bond sales is depicted
in Figure 2. The exit was not announced. The sales were carried out anonymously, and
remained largely unnoticed. The first piece of information as to the fact that the SNB was
selling off its bonds came in late August 2010 with the release of its monthly balance sheet
statistics (monthly bulletin). At this time, nearly all the bonds had been sold off.
At the height of the program, the SNB had purchased a total of about CHF 3 billion
worth of bonds, or about 0.5% of Swiss GDP, which is small relative to for example the Fed-
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Figure 1: SNB Purchases of bonds issued by private borrowers, in million CHF. 2009
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
20
10
-M
AR
CH
20
10
-A
PR
IL
20
10
-M
AY
20
10
-J
UN
E
20
10
-J
UL
Y
20
10
-A
UG
US
T
SNB covered bond sales, m illion CHF
SNB  non-bank corporate bond sales, m illion CHF
Figure 2: SNB sales of bonds issued by private borrowers, in million CHF. 2010
6eral Reserve asset purchase programs (the total assets purchased by the Federal Reserve now
exceed 10% of GDP). The program was not small relative to the size of the Swiss bond mar-
ket, however. At the end of 2009, covered bonds on the balance sheet of the SNB amounted
to about 5% of the total market volume of covered bonds at that time, 20% of gross new
issuance and 100% of net new issuance of covered bonds in the Swiss market in 2009. The
corporate bond purchases were less substantial, both in absolute and in relative terms.
How should we expect the SNB’s announcement and subsequent bond purchases to have
affected private sector bond yields? The yield of a bond can be written as consisting of a risk
neutral part as given by expected future short interest rates, and a term premium, according
to:
imt,j = RN
m
t + TPM
m
t + TPI
m
t,j (1)
where t is time, j is the specific issuer, and m is maturity. RNmt is the risk-neutral part
of the interest rate. The term TPMmt is a macro risk premium, capturing for example un-
certainty regarding the growth and inflation outlook, or changes in overall risk aversion. In
contrast, TPImt,j is an issuer specific risk premium, which depends on issuer specific risks such
as the risk of default of the issuer in question, risk aversion, and preferred habitat. Whereas
per definition, TPImt,j differs across issuers, RN
m
t and TPM
m
t are the same for all bonds in
the country in question.
The effect of the bond purchase program on bond yields can be divided into two broad
categories, namely the policy signaling effect and the portfolio balance effect discussed in the
introduction. First, the SNB bond purchase program could have signalled to the markets
something about how the SNB perceived the economic situation and prospects. In turn, the
program would have affected the market view of how the SNB intended to set short term
interest rates in the future. Such changes in expected future policy rates would affect RNmt .
Policy signalling effects could have occurred both at the announcement of the policy, and
when the subsequent outright purchases took place, as both types of instances could have
contained separate new information.
Second, portfolio balance effects would arise because central bank purchases of bonds
directly from the markets would reduce the remaining supply of such bonds in the market.
Private portfolios would hence have to adjust. All else equal, a reduction in the supply of
a bond would tend to increase the price of that bond relative to the prices of other assets
according to theories of portfolio balance (see for example Tobin (1965), Hamilton and Wu
(2012) or Vayanos and Vila (2009)). The portfolio balance effect would affect the TPImt,j part
of the yield. It is possible that the TPImt,j of close substitutes to the bonds purchased by the
central bank would also be affected through substitution effects.
The portfolio balance effect can occur at announcement and when the actual purchases
take place, depending on the level of information that markets have at each of these types
of events. If market participants know in advance the size of the purchases, the timing and
the type of bonds to be purchased, it is reasonable to assume that some, if not all, of the
portfolio balance effects will happen instantly, as markets discount the expected change in
the price. However, in the case of the SNB bond purchase program, and as opposed to the
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Figure 3: The SNB bond purchases and the 10-year yield on Confederation bonds
Federal Reserve and Bank of England programs, this information was not relayed with the
announcement of the program, nor at any later stage prior to the termination of the program.
Markets were hence left to infer from the subsequent actions of the SNB which types of bonds
would be purchased and how much. Portfolio balance effects could hence have occurred both
at announcement time, and in connection with the subsequent actual purchases.
Separating the effect of the program into a policy signaling effect which affects risk-neutral
rates only, and a portfolio balance effect which affects the term premium only, is of course a
convenient simplification which facilitates the empirical analysis. A few potential complica-
tions should be noted, however, as they will have to be kept in mind for the specification of
the baseline regression and controls.
First, the news that the announcement provided to the markets about the future eco-
nomic outlook and the seriousness of the situation could also have affected the uncertainty
about expected future growth and inflation outcomes, which in turn would affect TPMmt .
This could in turn have increased market risk aversion, which would have affected bonds
as a function of their level of risk, and hence, TPImt,j. Moreover, if markets adjusted their
expectations of the economic outlook when the bond purchase program was announced, then
this could have affected the expected default risk of certain borrowers more than others, in
turn affecting TPImt,j. These effects through risk aversion and expected default risk have to
be kept in mind, as we will need to control for them in our regressions.
The purchase program could also have affected the market liquidity of the purchased
bonds, which in turn could have affected their attractiveness and hence price. This market
liquidity effect (to be distinguished from the liquidity effect of higher bank reserves) would
also affect the issuer specific term premium of the bonds, TPImt,j. We take this possible mar-
ket liquidity effect into account in the empirical specification by controlling for a measure of
market liquidity specific to the categories of the purchased bonds.
8Finally, any unsterilized asset purchases by a central bank increases banks’ reserves and
hence the money supply. In turn, more bank reserves could increase the overall demand for
assets from banks, which in turn would tend to increase the price of assets, as argued in
Krogstrup et al. (2012). The effect is referred to as a liquidity effect in the traditional macro
literature (see for example Cochrane (1989)). All else equal, the liquidity effect should not
discriminate between assets in banks’ portfolios. It could hence reduce TPMmt , but should
not necessarily affect the issuer specific term premium TPImt,j . One exception is worth men-
tioning. Empirically, liquidity effects have mainly been found in the yields of highly liquid
and safe bonds such as government bonds. It could hence be that the liquidity created by the
bond purchases would have had the effect of reducing Confederation bond yields more than
the yields of other bonds. If so, this would not be a problem for our identification strategy
here, as explained in Section 5.2. Note that there is no reason to expect liquidity effects of
the bond purchase program itself to have been important in Switzerland, given the relatively
small size of the program, as well as the high level of bank reserves already in the system at
this time due to other unconventional policy measures. Just as is the case for the portfolio
balance effect, liquidity effects could occur at announcement as well as at the actual bond
purchase times, depending on the market’s level of information at these events. With a few
short-lived exceptions, Confederation bond yields did not generally fall during the period in
which the SNB was buying bonds, see Figure 3.
The discussion of the different effects of the bond purchase program implies that if we
isolate TPImt,j in the data, and associate it with the announcement time of the SNB bond
purchase program as well as the dates of the subsequent actual bond purchases, and control
for changes in risk aversion, market liquidity and expected default risk, then any remaining
significantly negative correlation with the bond purchases or with the announcement of the
bond purchase program should indicate portfolio balance effects.
3 The credit spread as a measure of the issuer specific term
premium
Based on Equation (1), we compute the issuer specific term premium as the spread of the
yield on any individual bond over the yield on the corresponding maturity Confederation
bond.
CSmt,j = i
m
t,j − imt,conf
= TPImt,j − TPImt,conf (2)
We then assume that TPImt,Conf is orthogonal to the SNB’s bond purchases. As discussed
above, liquidity effects of the bond purchases could affect the Confederation bond specific
term premium, but such an effect would only bias our results downward. Apart from liq-
uidity effects, the assumption of an orthogonal TPImt,Conf is reasonable in light of the liquid
market for Confederation bonds and the very low default risk of these bonds. In order to get
a smooth series for the credit spread over time, we take a weighted average of these bond
specific term premia across categories of bonds traded in the Swiss bond market, to get credit
indices for covered bonds, domestic non-bank corporates, cantonal bonds and bank bonds.
90.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
The Credit Index for Swiss Bonds
The Credit Index for non-bank corporate issuers 
The Credit Index for Covered Bonds (pfandbriefe)
Figure 4: The credit index for total, covered and corporate bonds
The first two are the focus of this analysis. The latter two indices are used for comparison,
as substitutes for a counterfactual.
The credit indices are derived from individual bond yield-to-maturity spreads over Swiss
Confederation bonds of the same maturity (the latter interpolated using a spline), aggregated
according to the emission volume of the bond in question, and across all maturities.1 The
individual bond data are derived from the SNB internal database on Swiss bond market fea-
tures, which in turn in based on data available from the SIX Swiss Exchange. Both indices
are based on a sufficiently large set of observations for every point in time to be representative
of overall market conditions. The resulting series for covered and corporate bonds, as well as
an index comprising all bonds in the Swiss bond market, are depicted in Figure 4.
4 Event study approach
We start with an investigation of the announcement, onset and purchase period in the spring
and summer of 2009, and finish up with an inspection of the exit in 2010.
4.1 The announcement and the bond purchases in 2009
Figure 5 depicts the covered spread together with the SNB bond purchases from December
2008 to September 2009. The two vertical lines in the Figure denote, first, the announcement
of the program and beginning of the covered bond purchases on Thursday 12 March, and
second, the onset of the more moderate non-bank corporate bond purchases on Monday 6
April 2009. The covered spread on covered bonds at first did not react to the announcement.
1The averaging over different maturities could cause the credit index to be correlated with the average time-
to-maturity in the market. However, the mean time-to-maturity shows little variation over time and is never
significant in the various regressions we conduct.
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Figure 5: Daily covered bond credit spread and the SNB covered bond purchases in 2009, levels
Zooming in on the months of March and April of 2009, Figure 6 shows that the covered spread
remained steady between the morning of Thursday 12 March and the morning of Friday 13
March (the data underlying the calculation of the spread is observed between 9am and 11am
in the morning). The spread also largely did not move between the morning of Friday 13
March and Monday 16 March. A drop of about 10 basis points then occurred between the
morning of Monday 16 March and the morning of Tuesday 17 March. The spread fell further
between 17 March and 19 March 2009, and largely continued to drop in the weeks after the
onset of the covered bond purchases.
How unusual is a 10 basis point daily change in the covered credit spread? Figure 7 shows
the daily changes in the covered credit spread between 2002 and 2011. Daily changes falling
within the shaded area are within 10 basis points. The Figure shows that since 2002, only
seven days saw changes in the covered credit spread which were larger than 10 basis points.
10 basis points is five times the standard deviation of the spread over the sample period.
Figure 7 shows that the standard deviation of changes in the spread has been time varying,
and that it seems to have been elevated during the time period of the SNB bond purchases.
Still, during the year between mid-2008 and mid-2009, there were only three observations of
daily changes in covered spread which exceeded 10 basis points.2 A 10 basis point change in
the spread is unusual, even during the crisis period of elevated volatility.
Figure 8 shows that there was no visible effect of the SNB announcement on 12 March
2009 on corporate bond spreads, nor were there any noticeable reactions in two to three days
afterwards. Instead, the corporate credit index started declining on 2 April 2009, a few days
before the SNB started outright purchases of non-bank corporate bonds on 6 April. From
pure visual inspection, however, it is not clear that this decline was related to the bond pur-
chase program.3
2To allow for time-varying variation, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model as a robustness test in Section 5.2
3A speech was given by the president of the SNB governing board on 2 April 2009, in which the intentions of
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Figure 6: Daily covered bond credit spread and the SNB covered bond purchases in 2009, levels
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Figure 8: Daily non-bank corporate credit index and cumulated SNB non-bank corporate bond
purchases in 2009, levels
Figures 9 and 10 depict the credit indices of two other categories of bonds which were not
purchased by the SNB, together with the SNB bond purchases. Inspecting the movements
of these spreads around the time of the announcement of the bond purchase program allows
us to assess whether any general movements in bond spreads took place during this period.
If so, it would suggest that something other than the SNB bond purchase program would be
responsible. Just as for corporate bond spreads, neither the spreads for cantonal bonds nor
the spreads for bank bonds were falling in the days following the SNB announcement. On the
contrary, spreads for other bond categories increased. The strong fall in covered bond spreads
is hence particular to covered bonds rather than a change in overall bond market conditions
or sentiment.
Figure 11 shows the movement of 10-year Confederation bond yields around the time of
the announcement of the SNB bond purchase program. Yields dropped in the days after the
announcement, which could reflect changes in all three components of the yield. The drop
suggests that the fall in the credit spread on covered bonds in the days after the announce-
ment came in spite of a drop in risk free rates, i.e. covered bond yields fell even more than
risk free yields.
Allowing for a window of three days for an announcement effect to happen is important in
the present study, as market participants were not informed of the SNB’s precise intentions,
and hence needed time to learn by observing the actions of the SNB. But the wide window
clearly increases the risk that other news and events could have been the cause of the move-
ments in the spread. We have hence carefully read through the Swiss financial press on all
days between 12 and 17 March 2009 in search of candidate news and events that could have
the bond purchase program were discussed. Whether or not this information was important for the spread is
difficult to assess.
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Figure 9: Daily cantonal bond credit index and the SNB total bond purchases, levels
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Figure 10: Daily bank bond credit index and the SNB total bond purchases, levels
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Figure 11: Covered credit spread and Confederation bond yields around the SNB announcement
been responsible for the identified fall in the covered spread, while not affecting the spreads
of other bond categories. We were not able to identify any such news or events. It follows
that the movement in the covered spread can be interpreted as a delayed discounted portfolio
balance effect, materializing after market participants had observed that the SNB was buying
covered bonds exclusively in the days after the announcement. In contrast, the purchases of
non-bank corporate bonds may never have been substantial enough to produce a detectable
market reaction.
Rather than a portfolio balance effect, could the drop in the covered credit spread reflect
a lower liquidity risk premium due to an increase in the expected liquidity of covered bonds
triggered by the fact that the SNB entered this particular market? Fully excluding this would
require assessing the liquidity risk premium rather precisely. Due to data limitations, this
is out of the scope of the present paper. However, data on bid-ask spreads, available in the
same dataset as that used for computing credit spreads, can provide a hint. We make use of a
market liquidity index based on bid-ask spreads, with the underlying assumption being that
as market liquidity thins out, bid-ask spreads should widen. While the order-flow literature
suggests that bid-ask spreads may capture much more than just liquidity (i.e. Stoll (1978)),
a number of empirical studies have found it to work relatively well as a proxy for liquidity
(i.e. Fleming (2003)). We hence compute the index as the emissions-weighted average bid-ask
spread of the bond category in question. Using this definition, the weighted average bid-ask
spread is consistent with the credit spread in terms of types of bonds included in the different
categories, the time of day at which the data are collected in the market, and how it relates
to the confederation bond market. It turns out that the weighted bid-ask spread is highly
positively correlated with the credit spread over the sample period from September 2000 to
December 2010, as one would expect if higher bid-ask spreads point to higher liquidity risk
premia, which in turn would widen the spread. If bid-ask spreads do contain information
about market liquidity, then Figure 12 suggests that the drop in the covered spread between
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Figure 12: Covered credit spread, market liquidity and SNB bond purchases
the mornings of 16 and 17 March 2009 were not related to lower liquidity premia. Bid-ask
spreads in fact increased in the covered bond market in the days following the announcement
of the bond purchase program.
In addition to the discounted portfolio balance effect after the announcement and imple-
mentation of the program, it is also possible that the subsequent actual purchases could have
had additional effects on the spreads at the time of purchase, if these purchases differed from
what was expected by market participants. Thus, if market participants had not expected
the extent to which covered bonds would be purchased, then the unexpected part of these
purchases could have had additional portfolio balance effects. It is not clear from pure visual
inspection of the charts that any such effects were present in covered bond spreads at purchase
times. In order to control for variation in other factors relevant for bond spreads–notably risk
aversion, liquidity and macroeconomic conditions–we conduct a regression analysis in Section
5 below.
4.2 The unannounced bond sales in 2010
The SNB’s exit from the bond purchase program could in principle also have had a discounted
reserve portfolio balance effect, if market participants had been made aware of the intended
bond sales at a specific point in time. This was not the case, however. The exit was never
announced, and in fact, awareness of the exit may have happened at different times for
different market participants. But it is clear that market participants were not aware that
the exit had happened before it had largely taken place. Moreover, judging from the press
as well as from anecdotal evidence, there is very little indication that market participants
were expecting the exit to happen in 2010. Hence, the bond sales in 2010 could have had a
systematic effect on credit spreads at the times of the actual sales, if central bank open market
operations have portfolio balance effects and if such effects can materialize without market
participants being explicitly aware of a change in market volumes. Figures 13 to 14 show
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Figure 13: Daily covered credit index and the SNB covered bond sales in 2010, levels
the covered and corporate bond credit spreads and the SNB holdings of the corresponding
bonds during the period of the sales in 2010 respectively. The Figures show very little sign
of an increase in bond spreads as a result of the sales. There is no clear consistent reaction
of the spread around the times of the sales, and spreads tend to generally decline rather
than increase over the time period. Of course, it cannot be excluded that this lack of visual
evidence of an effect is due to reverse causality (the same holds true for the the effect of
the bond purchases above). The SNB’s decisions to sell the bonds are likely to have been
affected by market conditions, including movements in the actual spreads on the bonds to be
sold, with the aim of preventing a market impact. In the regression analysis in Section 5, we
attempt to control for such reverse causality, but are not able to derive strong conclusions
due to a lack of appropriate instruments.
4.3 Conclusions from the event analysis
The event study supports the hypothesis that when the markets had observed the SNB’s pur-
chases of covered bonds in the days following the announcement of the program, an expected
portfolio balance effect of the SNB’s total expected purchases was discounted, leading to a
decline in the covered bond spread of about 10 basis points. No such effect was observed in
the spread for corporate bonds or any other bond category. Spreads generally declined in
the months following the first purchases, as we would expect from a further portfolio balance
effect on spreads. In contrast, spreads also slightly declined during the period of the bond
sales, whereas a portfolio balance effect of the sales should generate an increase in spreads. It
is hence not clear from the data that portfolio balance effects were present beyond the initial
discounted effect in the days following the announcement.
While these visual impressions are suggestive, no firm conclusions can be drawn on causal-
ity between the SNB bond purchase program and credit spread from the figures alone.4 First,
4This point is made by Stroebel and Taylor (2012) in a general critique of the event analysis approach to
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Figure 14: Daily corporate credit index and the SNB corporate bond sales in 2010, levels
we need to investigate whether the decline in the covered spread in the days after the an-
nouncement of the program was statistically significant. Moreover, we also need to control
for movements in other factors during the period in question. In particular, we need to as-
sess whether the subsequent bond purchases and sales might have had independent effects on
credit spreads aside from the announcement, when controlling for the main determinants of
credit spreads. We hence turn to econometric analysis of the bond purchase program.
5 Econometric investigation
We carry out regressions for the covered and non-bank corporate spread respectively, on dum-
mies for the days within the announcement window and the actual SNB bond purchases and
sales. We control for proxies for default risk, risk aversion, liquidity and general economic
conditions. The sample period is September 2000 to December 2010. We use daily data,
which allows us to carefully assess the effect of the announcement of the program and pos-
sible immediate effects of purchases on bond markets. The regressions are estimated in first
differences so as to circumvent non-stationarity problems (the credit spread has a unit root,
whereas the first difference is stationary). The baseline regression specification is in line with
the literature, e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Avramov et al. (2007). It should be
noted that portfolio balance effects of the actual purchases could materialize with a longer
delay than what we can allow for in a daily first differences specification. However, it is more
difficult to establish causality in levels regressions and regressions using weekly or monthly
frequency. We hence only carry out such regressions as a robustness checks. The baseline
specification is the following:
assessing the effects of the various asset purchase programs conducted by the Federal Reserve since the onset
of the financial crisis.
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∆cit =
3∑
i=1
βcoverediD
covered
t−i +
3∑
i=1
βcorpiD
corp
t−i +
1∑
i=0
βsnbi∆SNBbt−i + βvolvolt−1
+ βSPI∆SPIt−1 + βBA∆BidAskt + βTS∆TSt + βR∆R10yt + ut, (3)
where cit is the relevant credit spread. Dcoveredt is a dummy taking the value one on the
day of the announcement and first purchases of covered bonds, i.e. on the 12 March 2009,
and Dcorpt is a dummy taking the value one on the day of the first purchases of non-bank
corporate bonds. For consistency, both dummies are included with three lags to mirror the
event window identified in Section 4 above. The choice of three daily lags of the announce-
ment dummy allows us to test whether the strong drop in the covered bond spread between
the second and third business day after the announcement is significant when controlling for
other determinants of the spread. We do not include the contemporaneous announcement
dummy, because the press release and first purchases were made in the afternoon of the 12th
of March, whereas the data used for the calculation of the credit spread is collected during
the morning. ∆SNBbt captures the actual monthly purchases (+) and sales (-) of covered
and/or corporate bonds by the SNB in the period between March 2009 and August 2010.
We include the contemporaneous purchases and sales as well as a lag. The contemporaneous
value would capture immediate effects of bond purchases or sales carried out in the morning,
before the credit spread is recording. The lag is included in order to allow for all purchases
or sales that have taken place after the time of the recording of the credit spread to have
an effect on the credit spread the morning after. The purchases and sales are measured in
percent of the corresponding bond category’s emission volumes.
The control variables are the following. volt is the conditional stock price volatility esti-
mated during the sample period, included to control for a link between credit spreads and high
volatility periods (risk aversion).5 SPIt is a measure of expected loss due to default, which
we - following the previous literature - proxy by the log of the level of the main Swiss stock
price index, the SPI. Note that the SPI also captures the overall performance of the economy.
Volatility and the SPI are lagged one day to account for the fact that the data for these
variables are collected at market close while the data on credit spreads are collected during
the morning. All other daily variables are collected during the morning, and hence included
as contemporary variables only. In order to control for changes in market liquidity around the
announcement and purchase times, we include the average emission-volume-weighted bid-ask
spread of the bond category in question, less the average emission-volume-weighted bid-ask
spread for confederation bonds. The bid-ask spread is computed as the difference between
the black and green lines in Figure 12, which are explained in Section 4.1.
Macroeconomic developments are further controlled for by including the long term interest
rate level, i.e. the 10-year Confederation bond yield R10yt . Its empirical prior is negative (see
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)). A higher level of interest rates reflects strong business cycle
developments, which is good for firm profitability. Finally, we follow Fama and French (1989)
and include the term spread, TSt, defined as the difference between the 10-year Confederation
5We also tried using the VIX, and the expected stock price volatility based on the SPI. Results and conclusions
were unchanged.
19
bond yield and the three-month CHF libor. A higher term spread could be taken to signal
higher uncertainty about future economic outcomes, suggesting a positive relation with credit
spreads.
We do not include intercepts in the regressions for which we report the results, given that
first differences are used. Whether or not an intercept is included makes not difference to the
results. Moreover, intercepts are never significantly different from zero.
5.1 Regression results
Table 1 presents the results for the baseline regression using daily data for covered and non-
bank corporate spreads in column one and two. Most control variables have the correct signs,
and the term spread and the long-term bond yield are significant.
Confirming the visual impressions of Section 4, the third lag of the announcement and
purchases dummy for covered bonds is significantly negative in the covered bond spread re-
gression, suggesting that the spread declined by about 10 basis points on that day without any
of the control variables included in the regression being able to account for that. The decline
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. It is hence plausible that it is the result
of the markets’ evolving perception regarding the SNB intentions of purchasing covered bonds.
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Table 1: Baseline regression results
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .001 .002
(.002) (.004)
Dsnbcovt−2 .000 -.006
(.002) (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcovt−3 -.098 .017
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.027 -.030
(.001)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .012 .009
(.001)∗∗∗ (.011)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.012 .018
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
∆SNBbcovt 1.042
(.694)
∆SNBbcovt−1 -.654
(.780)
∆SNBbcorpt -1.418
(4.870)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 1.549
(4.616)
∆volt−1 · 100 -.150 -.106
(.170) (.261)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.053 -.032
(.040) (.069)
∆BidAskt .002 .004
(.003) (.005)
∆TSt .093 .146
(.032)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗
∆R10yt -.194 -.380
(.032)∗∗∗ (.058)∗∗∗
Obs. 2307 2302
R2 .057 .079
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The results also confirm that the announcement did not affect corporate bonds to the
same degree. The second lag after announcement is significantly negative, while the third lag
is positive. None of the estimated parameters for the lags are of an economically relevant
size. The same lack of economic relevance holds true for the dummy for the beginning of the
corporate bond purchases on the 6th April 2009.
Turning to the parameter estimates for the outright bond purchases and sales of the SNB,
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these come with the expected negative sign, but they are insignificant in both regressions.
The data thus does not support the hypothesis that there were additional immediate portfolio
balance effects associated with the outright purchases and sales. Given that market partic-
ipants had very different information sets about the purchases and sales, it is possible that
the effect of the two on markets would be different. Using a dummy taking the value one
from January 2010 onwards, the specification in Table 2 allows the effects of the purchases
and the effects of the sales in 2010 to differ. Again, neither the purchases nor the sales have
significant effects on credit spreads.
Table 2: Baseline with an interaction dummy for bond sales
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .014 .002
(.026) (.004)
Dsnbcovt−2 -.057 -.007
(.150) (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcovt−3 -.001 .016
(.234) (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 .017 -.048
(.107) (.022)∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .033 .073
(.049) (.091)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.055 .025
(.110) (.011)∗∗
∆SNBbcovt -45.120
(113.523)
∆SNBbcovt−1 40.104
(102.892)
∆SNBbcorpt 30.933
(42.239)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 -26.930
(40.111)
Obs. 2129 2124
R2 .055 .075
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The lack of an effect of the outright bond market interventions could reflect the efficient
markets hypothesis that the effect of the purchases was discounted in the price of covered
bonds as soon as the markets has realized that the SNB would be buying covered bonds. This
interpretation implies that markets knew what the aggregate portfolio balance effect of the
purchases would be, and expected correctly when they would be sold off again. This seems
unlikely. Alternatively, the lack of an effect of the interventions would also be consistent with
the view that markets discounted an expected effect of the interventions, but that no such
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effect exists if markets are unaware of the central bank’s actions.
In conclusion, the data supports the hypothesis that there was an announcement effect
of the first covered bond purchases on the spreads of covered bonds. However, there is no
evidence in the data of an economically relevant effect of the bond purchase program on non-
bank corporate bonds.
5.2 Robustness
Tables 3 to 7 display the results of a series of robustness tests. First, as already discussed
in Section 4, it is likely that the SNB adjusted its purchases and sales according to the mar-
ket conditions of the purchased bonds. For example, it is possible that covered bonds were
purchased in larger quantities on days where prices of these were going down and yields up,
as it was the intention of the SNB to reduce the yield spreads. Similarly, it is likely that
more bonds were sold on days when the prices of the bonds were increasing and yields falling,
during the sales period in 2010. This suggests a source of endogneity of the SNB’s bond
market interventions which would tend to bias the parameter estimates of the regressions
downward. There are two ways of addressing this type of endogeneity in the literature (see
for example Manganelli (2012) and references therein). One way is to investigate intra-day
high-frequency data. We do not have intra-day data on credit spreads. The second option is
to use instruments. We are not aware of any good instrumental variable for SNB bond market
interventions. We instead tried to carry out a TSLS regression using lags of the explanatory
variables as instruments. As could be expected, standard errors increase strongly, leading
to a decline in significance. The conclusions from using instruments are largely the same as
those from standard regressions, and we hence do not report the results here.6 In lack of
appropriate instruments, however, it is not possible to make any firm conclusions on the lack
of an effect.
Second, Table 3 shows that a longer average maturity of outstanding total bonds is found
to significantly reduce the covered credit spread. However, the inclusion of average maturity
does not affect the conclusions from the baseline regressions. It should be added that no
redemptions or new issues of covered bonds took place during the week after the announce-
ments of the bond purchase program, and hence, that there was no exceptional variation in
the average maturity in those days.
Third, in the months and year after the announcement of the SNB bond purchase program,
corporate spreads generally declined in western countries. This was a period of increasing calm
in global financial markets. Could the decline in the covered spread following the announce-
ment of the bond purchase program have reflected a more general decline in international
corporate spreads? Table 4 shows that controlling for movements in different types of US and
European corporate spreads do not change the findings. The foreign spreads used here are
not even significant in explaining daily changes in Swiss covered and corporate spreads.
Fourth, Table 5 shows the regression results when controlling for the market liquidity of
6The results are available upon request.
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Table 3: Controlling for the average maturity of the bonds within the given category
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .001 .002
(.002) (.004)
Dsnbcovt−2 .000 -.006
(.002) (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcovt−3 -.098 .017
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.028 -.030
(.001)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .011 .009
(.001)∗∗∗ (.011)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.012 .018
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
∆SNBbcovt 1.016
(.694)
∆SNBbcovt−1 -.656
(.777)
∆SNBbcorpt -1.418
(4.867)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 1.534
(4.621)
∆volt−1 · 100 -.149 -.106
(.170) (.261)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.051 -.032
(.040) (.069)
∆BidAskt .002 .004
(.003) (.005)
∆TSt .091 .146
(.033)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗
∆R10yt -.192 -.380
(.033)∗∗∗ (.058)∗∗∗
∆ logMatpft -.776 .084
(.289)∗∗∗ (.412)
Obs. 2307 2302
R2 .059 .079
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Controlling for movements in foreign corporate spreads
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .003 .003
(.003) (.004)
Dsnbcovt−2 .011 .000
(.009) (.008)
Dsnbcovt−3 -.095 .019
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.028 -.030
(.001)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .011 .011
(.001)∗∗∗ (.011)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.013 .017
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
∆SNBbcovt 1.291
(.741)∗
∆SNBbcovt−1 -.708
(.796)
∆SNBbcorpt -1.029
(4.722)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 1.199
(4.715)
∆volt−1 · 100 -.156 -.115
(.181) (.256)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.044 -.009
(.040) (.075)
∆BidAskt .003 .004
(.003) (.005)
∆TSt .093 .144
(.032)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗
∆R10yt -.193 -.375
(.032)∗∗∗ (.058)∗∗∗
∆CorpHLust -.022 -.012
(.019) (.017)
∆CorpHLeut .022 .043
(.015) (.030)
Obs. 2307 2302
R2 .061 .082
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 318th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses
are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the purchased bonds independently of the market liquidity of confederation bonds. The re-
sults confirm the conclusions derived from Figure 12. The average bid-ask spread as a proxy
for market liquidity is not significant and its inclusion does not change the finding that the
covered credit spread fell significantly in the days following the announcement.
Fifth, Table 6 uses a different proxy for risk aversion, namely the spread between the
3-month Libor and the 3-month term overnight interest swap rate. The change of control
variable is inconsequential for the significance of the relevant parameter estimates.
Further, as already commented on in Section 4, Figure 7 suggest that some periods are
more volatile than others, i.e. that the first differences of credit spreads has time varying
variation. We allow for time varying variation by estimating a Garch(1,1) specification using
maximum likelihood techniques. The GARCH specification becomes:
∆cit =α+ βσσ
2
t + βSPI∆SPIt−1 + βsnb∆SNBbt + βdcov∆D
snbcov
t−1
+ βdcorp∆D
snbcorp
t−1 + βTS∆TSt + βR∆R
10y
t + βBA∆BidAskt + ut, (4)
σ2t =ω + αu
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1, (5)
ut|Ft−1 ∼ N (0,σ2t ), (6)
where Ft−1 is the information set in period t-1. Results for the estimation of this specifi-
cation, given in Table 7, confirm the results from the baseline specification.
Finally, the lack of significance of the actual bond purchases and sales in the credit spread
regressions could be taken to reflect the daily frequency of the data used and/or the use of
first differences. We find that this is not the case. In regressions in levels, with and without a
lagged dependent, the outright purchases and sales remain largely insignificant (not shown).7
7There is an exception, in that the outright corporate bond purchases turn significant in some specifications.
But when this is the case, the contemporaneous and lagged effects cancel out. Moreover, the finding is not
robust. The results from the levels regressions show clear signs of misspecification, with high autocorrelation
and very instable parameter estimates. Results from the levels regressions are available from the authors.
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Table 5: Including liquidity measures for Confederation, Covered and Corporate bonds separately
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .004 .004
(.003) (.004)
Dsnbcovt−2 .002 -.007
(.002) (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcovt−3 -.097 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.028 -.031
(.002)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .012 .009
(.001)∗∗∗ (.011)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.011 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
∆SNBbcovt .994
(.698)
∆SNBbcovt−1 -.703
(.780)
∆SNBbcorpt -1.544
(4.913)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 1.734
(4.649)
∆volt−1 · 100 -.156 -.112
(.171) (.262)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.055 -.039
(.040) (.070)
∆BidAskt -.005 .020
(.006) (.019)
∆TSt .087 .157
(.037)∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗
∆R10yt -.175 -.382
(.037)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗
∆BidAskcovt -.005 -.008
(.008) (.008)
∆BidAskconft -.005 .016
(.008) (.018)
Obs. 2179 2179
R2 .051 .078
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Controlling for LibTois
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .003 .002
(.002) (.003)
Dsnbcovt−2 .003 -.004
(.002) (.002)∗∗
Dsnbcovt−3 -.097 .017
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.027 -.027
(.001)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .014 .015
(.001)∗∗∗ (.012)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.011 .019
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
∆SNBbcovt .857
(.723)
∆SNBbcovt−1 -.625
(.783)
∆SNBbcorpt -.707
(4.910)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 -.244
(4.780)
∆LibToist−1 · 100 .039 .033
(.027) (.037)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.053 -.015
(.041) (.071)
∆BidAskt .003 .004
(.003) (.006)
∆TSt .078 .134
(.031)∗∗ (.053)∗∗
∆R10yt -.176 -.371
(.031)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗
Obs. 2167 2162
R2 .06 .082
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (Newey-West) standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
28
Table 7: GARCH estimates: conditional volatility (OIM)
Covered Bonds Corporate Bonds
(1) (2)
Dsnbcovt−1 .006 .008
(.014) (.031)
Dsnbcovt−2 .002 -.004
(.014) (.015)
Dsnbcovt−3 -.098 .019
(.013)∗∗∗ (.014)
Dsnbcorpt−1 -.027 -.034
(.011)∗∗ (.017)∗∗
Dsnbcorpt−2 .013 .006
(.010) (.015)
Dsnbcorpt−3 -.011 .018
(.010) (.011)
∆SNBbcovt 1.170
(.824)
∆SNBbcovt−1 -1.256
(.841)
∆SNBbcorpt -1.396
(3.746)
∆SNBbcorpt−1 3.515
(3.469)
∆ logSPIt−1 -.019 -.063
(.033) (.045)
∆BidAskt .001 .002
(.002) (.003)
∆TSt .042 .100
(.023)∗ (.036)∗∗∗
∆R10yt -.125 -.306
(.024)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
σˆ2 .016 -.023
(.017) (.013)∗
α .348 .468
(.057)∗∗∗ (.103)∗∗∗
β .537 .622
(.096)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗
ω .000 .000
(.000)∗ (.000)
df 4.414 2.780
(.398)∗∗∗ (.165)∗∗∗
Obs. 2307 2302
Notes: The sample period is September 1st, 2000, until December 31th, 2010. The numbers in parentheses are
observed information matrix standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
29
6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of the SNB bond purchase program of 2009-2010 on
Swiss bond spreads, and found evidence in favor of an effect of the program on the credit
spreads of covered bonds in the order of about 10 basis points. The effect materialized in the
days following the announcement of the program and first bond purchases. No further effects
of the subsequent actual bond purchases were found. Moreover, there was no evidence in the
data of an effect of the program on corporate bond spreads. Finally, the unannounced bond
sales in 2010 did not affect the spreads of the bond categories that were sold off. Markets
were not aware of the sales until they were largely over, and the bonds were sold off during a
period of low risk aversion and high demand for bonds.
The design of the empirical investigation allows us to plausibly identify the effect on cov-
ered spreads in the days after announcement as market participants discounting an expected
portfolio balance effect of the SNB bond purchases. We interpret this effect as a lower bound
for the total possible effect of the bond purchase program on bond yields. We cannot exclude
that the subsequent actual bond purchases had further portfolio balance effects on spreads
beyond those we identify, if, for example, such effects materialized with a delay of more than a
few days, of if the effects on spreads were irregular or differed across purchases. The data and
our empirical strategy does not allow us to pick up such delayed or irregular effects. We also
cannot exclude that possible reverse causality conceals an impact of the actual purchases on
spreads. In addition, the bond purchase program could have had signaling effects on expected
future policy and short term interest rates. Signalling effects would not appear in the spreads
we investigate, but rather in yields directly. The data we use does not allow us to identify
such effects.
The findings suggest more generally that central bank asset purchases programs are per-
ceived by the market as having portfolio balance effects, whether or not such portfolio balance
mechanisms really are active. These expected effects are then discounted in the prices of the
purchased assets at announcement and/or at the onset of the purchase program, depending on
the level of information offered at the announcement of the program. One implication is that
the way in which bond purchase programs and their exit are announced and communicated
is central to the effect the central bank achieves.
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Table 8: Data
Acronym Explanation
cit Credit index total. Average emissions-weighted spread
of yields of all bonds with initial emissions volumes in
excess of CHF 100 mill, over same-maturity Confeder-
ation bond yield. Data collected daily between 9 and
11am. Source: SNB
ciindt Same as credit index, but restricted to contain only
non-bank corporate issuers. Source: SNB.
cipft Same as credit index, but restricted to contain only
covered bonds (pfandbriefe). Source: SNB.
BidAskpft Average emissions-weighted bid-ask spread for covered
bonds less that for confederation bonds. SNB-internal
computations.
BidAskindt Average emissions-weighted bid-ask spread for non-
bank corporate bonds less that for confederation
bonds. SNB-internal computations.
CorpHLjt Spread between BBB and AAA rated corporate debt,
j = EU,US.(BOFA Merrill Lynch, Datastream)
Dit Dummy for the date of the first purchases of bonds i,
i = covered, corporate.
LibToist Spread between Swiss 3M Libor and TOIS. 3M Li-
bor is collected daily at 11am in London (12am in
Zurich).TOIS is collected at 11am in Zurich. Source:
SNB
Matt Mean time-to-maturity of outstanding bonds. Based
on bond data collected daily between 9 and 11am.
Source: SNB
R10yt Zero coupon yield on 10-year government bond (Con-
federation bond). Based on bond data collected daily
between 9 and 11am. Source: SNB.
SNBbt Cumulated purchases of bonds by the SNB, market
value, in percent of emissions volume. Source: SNB
SNBbindt Cumulated purchases of non-bank corporate bonds by
the SNB, market value, in percent of corporate emis-
sions volume. Source: SNB.
SNBbpft Cumulated purchases of covered bonds by the SNB,
market value, in percent of covered emissions volume.
Source: SNB.
SPIt Total returns on the Swiss Performance Index. Col-
lected daily at market close. Source: SNB.
TSt Term spread between 10 year zero coupon yields
on government bonds and 3-month CHF Libor rate.
Based on data collected between 9am and 11am daily.
Source: SNB.
volt Conditional volatility of the SPI, GARCH(1, 1).
Based on data collected daily at market close. SNB
internal calculations. Source: SNB.
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 P.O. Box, CH-8022 Zurich 
Telephone +41 44 631 31 11 
Fax +41 44 631 39 10 
 
Zurich, 12 March 2009 
 
Monetary policy assessment of 12 March 2009 
Swiss National Bank takes decisive action to forcefully relax 
monetary conditions 
 
The economic situation has deteriorated sharply since last December, and there is a risk of 
negative inflation over the next three years. Decisive action is thus called for, to 
forcefully relax monetary conditions. Against this background, the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) is making another interest rate cut and acting to prevent any further appreciation 
of the Swiss franc against the euro. To this end, it will increase liquidity substantially by 
engaging in additional repo operations, buying Swiss franc bonds issued by private sector 
borrowers and purchasing foreign currency on the foreign exchange markets. 
The SNB is lowering the target range for the three-month Libor by 25 basis points, 
narrowing it to 0–0.75%, with immediate effect. It will use all means at its disposal to 
gradually bring the Libor down to the lower end of the new target range, i.e. to 
approximately 0.25%. Thus, the Libor now has a narrower target range of 75 basis points, 
compared with 100 previously. 
With these exceptional measures, the SNB is helping to cushion the effects of the 
economic and financial crisis, with the aim of limiting the risk of deflation. The SNB has a 
mandate to ensure price stability, while taking economic developments into account. This 
objective encompasses the prevention of both deflation and inflation. In carrying out its 
mandate, the National Bank will – as it has in the past – base its decisions on an inflation 
forecast. 
The fourth quarter of 2008 saw a sharp slowdown in the world economy, which affected all 
countries simultaneously. There is every reason to believe that the deterioration has 
continued over the past two months. The Swiss economy is being hit hard by these 
developments, and they are affecting nearly all sectors of the economy. The export 
industry is bearing the brunt, however. As a result, the SNB is revising its GDP growth 
forecast downwards for the year under review. It now expects real GDP to fall by between 
2.5% and 3%. 
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The rapid deterioration in the economic situation and the decline in commodity prices 
have also led to a clear downward revision of the inflation forecast. Average annual 
inflation will amount to –0.5% in 2009. With the measures decided today, the SNB is 
forecasting average annual inflation for the following two years of virtually zero. 
This inflation outlook calls for decisive action on the part of the SNB. By once again 
lowering the three-month Libor target range and acting to prevent any further 
appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro, the SNB is seeking to counter the risk of 
deflation and of a dramatic deterioration in the economy. 
Global economic outlook 
Economic activity has declined sharply in the U.S., where consumption and exports have 
plummeted. The European economy has also undergone a significant contraction. The 
Asian economies, far from remaining unscathed by these developments, have also been 
heavily affected. The crisis that started in the financial markets of developed countries 
has spilled over to the real economy and is now impacting on the entire global economy. 
Against this background, the SNB has made a substantial downward revision to its growth 
forecasts for the major economies in 2009. 
Swiss economic outlook 
In Switzerland too, the economic situation has experienced a clear and rapid deterioration 
over the last six months. In the fourth quarter of 2008, real GDP dropped by 1.2% in 
annualised terms. While the contraction in economic activity appeared to be less 
pronounced in Switzerland than in the major European countries, this figure nevertheless 
obscures the extent of the collapse in global demand, in particular in the manufacturing 
industry, with the concomitant sharp drop in exports. Expenditure on equipment 
investment was cut significantly. Construction investment also saw negative growth, 
resulting in a significant decline in final demand. 
The magnitude of the contraction in demand in the fourth quarter of 2008 was 
unexpected. The result was an involuntary swelling of inventories, which contributed 
artificially to growth in GDP. This phenomenon is likely to reverse in the first quarter of 
this year. Consequently, the SNB expects an increased contraction in GDP in early 2009. 
Unemployment has begun to grow again since September 2008, a trend that will continue 
in the months ahead. The resulting climate of uncertainty will prompt households to 
exercise more caution and will lead to a slowdown in consumer spending. In addition, 
weak global demand is likely to weigh on Swiss exports, which will force companies to 
defer or reconsider their investment plans. By contrast, favourable financing conditions 
will probably continue to support investment in residential construction. Moreover, public 
spending will play a countercyclical role. Due to the deepening of the global recession, 
the SNB is now forecasting a contraction in GDP of between 2.5% and 3% for this year. 
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Changes in monetary and financial conditions 
The SNB lowered the Libor target range decisively by 225 basis points over the course of 
the fourth quarter of last year. This monetary policy impetus will continue to feed through 
progressively to the economy. Short-term interest rates have dropped, and the interest 
rate curve has steepened. However, capital market risk premia have risen substantially 
since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, hampering the transmission of monetary policy 
stimuli. This is prompting the SNB to purchase Swiss franc bonds issued by private sector 
borrowers in order to bring about a relaxation of conditions on the capital markets. 
The value of the Swiss franc has increased substantially since the beginning of the 
financial crisis in August 2007. This currency development has gained momentum since 
the National Bank's last assessment in December. Under the present circumstances, this 
represents an inappropriate tightening of monetary conditions. In view of this 
development, the SNB has decided to purchase foreign currency on the foreign exchange 
market, to prevent any further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. 
While M1 and M2 are registering strong growth rates, that of M3 remains moderate. In 
contrast, the monetary base almost doubled in one year. This development reflected the 
SNB’s efforts to provide the interbank market with sufficient liquidity – as a response to 
the huge increase in the demand for liquidity brought about by the prevailing climate of 
uncertainty. If this demand had not been satisfied, the result would have been an 
undesirable rise in interest rates. 
Since the beginning of 2008, the SNB has been conducting a qualitative survey with 
twenty banks which make up the bulk of the domestic loan market. The survey carried out 
in January 2009 shows that some banks have tightened their lending conditions slightly. 
Moreover, a growing number of banks are expecting to do so in the near future. While the 
statistics confirm lower growth in overall lending, they do not show an actual decline. 
Mortgage lending has remained unaffected by this development. The rate of growth in this 
area has risen since November, reaching 3.8% in January. It is too soon to tell whether 
this is an effect linked to the lowering of the three-month Libor, as has been observed in 
the past. By contrast, the growth rate in other loans has dropped sharply. It stood at 
5.8% in January, compared with 20% a year earlier. In this category, lending is strongly 
cyclical and related to developments in the economy. The other loans, therefore, should 
decline in the near future. Overall, developments on the Swiss lending market have not 
followed the pattern observed abroad. 
Inflation and inflation risks 
After reaching a peak of 3.1% last July, inflation dropped back to 0.2% in February. This 
is attributable to the spectacular drop in the oil price from USD 145 to around USD 40 a 
barrel during the same period, as well as the appreciation of the Swiss franc. Inflation will 
continue to fall and will enter negative territory in the course of 2009. This is due to the 
prices of imported goods and services, in particular oil. They will be lower this year 
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compared with last year’s elevated levels. By contrast, inflation in domestic goods and 
services, despite weakening during the year, will remain positive in 2009. 
For 2010 and 2011, inflation will remain very close to zero, because output will be below 
potential and unemployment will be high. Should the economy deteriorate more severely 
than expected, there would be a risk of negative inflation. 
Monetary policy decision 
A prolonged period of negative inflation is not compatible with the objective of 
maintaining medium-term price stability. Any tightening of monetary conditions is 
inappropriate in this depressed environment. By once again lowering the three-month 
Libor target range to 0–0.75%, by gradually bringing the Libor down to the lower end of 
this range, i.e. to around 0.25%, and by acting to prevent a further appreciation of the 
Swiss franc against the euro, the SNB is pursuing its expansionary monetary policy in 
order to support economic activity and limit the risk of deflation. The temporary 
narrowing of the Libor target range, which now stands at 75 basis points compared with 
the usual 100 basis points, is due to the fact that a negative Libor is not technically 
possible. 
Inflation forecast chart 
While the previous forecast (dash-dotted green curve) was based on the assumption that 
the three-month Libor would remain unchanged at 0.5%, the new curve is based on a 
Libor of 0.25%. It shows strongly negative inflation in 2009. This is, in essence, 
attributable to movements in the price of oil (base effect). In 2010 and 2011, inflation 
will remain very low, despite a Libor of 0.25%. This is due to the unfavourable economic 
outlook. Inflation will increase slightly at the end of 2011. This slight uptick in inflation 
is explained by the fact that a Libor of 0.25% does not represent an equilibrium level 
capable of guaranteeing price stability in the longer term. 
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Observed inflation March 2009 
2005 2006 2007 2008
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2005 2006 2007 2008
Inflation 1.35 1.06 1.18 1.10 1.23 1.33 1.22 0.46 0.09 0.52 0.63 1.68 2.50 2.70 3.00 1.60 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.5
 
Inflation forecast of December 2008 with Libor at 0.50% and of March 2009 with Libor at
0.25% 
2009 2010 2011
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Forecast December 2008,
Libor at 0.50%
   1.66 1.17 0.73 0.59 0.99 0.80 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.54 0.64  0.9 0.5
Forecast March 2009,
2008 2010 20112009
Libor at 0.25%
    0.10 -0.86 -0.98 -0.43 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.25 -0.5 0.1 0.1
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